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Abstract
The U.S. government regularly participates as a buyer in industrial markets
where products are customarily sold through indirect marketing and distribution chains,
separating buyers from manufacturers. In many cases, these marketing, distribution, and
store-front activities add significant value for buyers, such as through pre- and post-sale
service and support, improvements to product availability, and reductions in per-unit
pricing (e.g., via economies due to warehousing, transportation, and ordering
processes). Accordingly, the government (U.S. Small Business Administration) has, in
some instances, issued class waivers to the requirements of the “non-manufacturer rule”
(15 U.S.C. § 657s) when no small business manufacturers exist for a product, such that
contracts can be set aside for competition among small business non-manufacturers.
This study models the effectiveness of class non-manufacturer rule waivers on the
utilization of small business concerns. The purpose of the research is to obtain a better
understanding of market and industry conditions in which these waivers are successful
at driving small business utilization, as well as conditions where class waivers, once
issued, tend to be poorly utilized. A time series panel of data derived from several
archival sources was used to estimate a fractional response model with a Bernoulli
quasi-maximum likelihood estimation methodology. Findings indicate that NMR waivers
work best to increase small business utilization in industries characterized by low
concentration and low levels of price inflation. Understanding these factors will inform
policy and regulation.
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Introduction
The Small Business Act of 1953 requires that a fair proportion of contract dollars
be awarded, or set aside, to small businesses (Sakallaris, 2007). This is not a trivial
directive as the public sector constitutes a huge market, approximately $2.1 trillion
annually in the United States alone. This means that a tremendous amount of those
public funds—$90.7 billion in fiscal year 2015 (Federal Procurement Data System,
2015)—is deliberately funneled to small businesses at all levels (municipal, county,
state, and federal) as a matter of public policy aimed at achieving socio-economic
benefits. The current, government-wide procurement goal stipulates that at least 23% of
all federal government contracting dollars should be set aside for small businesses with
targeted set-asides for Women Owned Small Business (5%), Small Disadvantaged
Business (5%), Service Disabled Veteran Owned Small Business (3%), and Historically
Underutilized Business Zones (3%).
Not only are socio-economic procurement programs important to the public
sector (Denes, 1997), they are also critical to the private sector. Small businesses
constitute approximately half of the private-sector economy and 99% of all businesses
(U.S. Small Business Administration [SBA], 2012). They account for 90% of exports and
innovations (Cullen, 2012). Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are important
to economic growth (Thurik & Wennekers, 2004; Wennekers & Thurik, 1999). SMEs
differ from large businesses in job creation, strategic flexibility, and innovation
(Audretsch, 2007). Consequently, economies with more SMEs are more competitive and
have higher growth rates than those with fewer SMEs (Audretsch et al., 2006).
Small- and medium-sized businesses are a fundamental element of the health
and economic viability of the United States (Sperling & Mills, 2012). According to the
National Economic Council, over the past 20 years, small and new businesses in the
United States have been responsible for creating two out of every three net new jobs
and employ half of the private sector workforce (Sperling & Mills, 2012). More
specifically, small businesses are a foundational element to communities (i.e.,
populations less than 10,000 people) and play a significant role in the economic health
of those communities (Yoshida & Deyle, 2005). Small businesses also service as critical
participants in the supply chain (Qi et al., 2014; Logozar, 2013).
Unfortunately, while the U.S. federal government annually seeks to award 23% of
contract dollars to small businesses, it often fails to fully achieve its small business goals
(FPDS, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015).
Impediments to small business contracting include contract bundling, strategic sourcing
resulting in supplier rationalization, a lack of accountability for achieving socio-economic
goals, a lack of small businesses in some industries, and many small businesses’ lack of
interest in performing government work (Grammich et al., 2011).
Given the criticality of small businesses to long-term economic viability, several
laws, regulations, and programs have been promulgated to advance their cause. One
such rule is the non-manufacturer rule (NMR), enacted by Section 303(h) of Public Law
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100-656 and Section 210 of Public Law 101-574. According to 13 C.F.R. § 121.406,1 for
a firm to qualify and represent itself as a small business concern on a federal
procurement for an end item, it must either be the manufacturer (or producer) of that end
item or meet additional criteria to qualify as a small non-manufacturer, including
supplying the end item of a small business manufacturer, processor, or producer. As of
2016, this rule applies exclusively to acquisitions in excess of the simplified acquisition
threshold, although smaller acquisitions were previously subject to the rule (81 FR
34243). Thus, the NMR allows a small business dealer who does not manufacture an
end item (e.g., a wholesaler, a distributor) to compete as a small concern under setaside federal contracts to supply that product, provided that the manufacturer is a small
business located in the United States and that certain other requirements of the NMR
are satisfied (FAR 19.001). However, in some industries, or for some end items or
classes of end items, no small business manufacturers exist. In such cases, a waiver to
the NMR could be requested—in the case of a class waiver, by the prospective small
business supplier, by the contracting officer, by an industry group, or by some other
entity—from the Small Business Administration (SBA) such that, for example, a small
business distributor can supply a product manufactured by a large business and still
qualify as a small business concern under a set-aside contract.
Granting class waivers in such markets dominated by large businesses should, in
theory, open opportunity for small businesses distributors to secure federal contracts.
From the buyer’s perspective, opening up markets to small business distributors should
expand the available supply base under a small business set-aside, further enhancing
competition and, in turn, reducing purchase prices (Chiang, Chhajed, & Hess, 2003).
Furthermore, making more small businesses eligible to provide certain products means
that more requirements can be set aside for small businesses, thereby increasing the
amount of dollars awarded to small businesses and helping buying agencies meet their
socio-economic goals.
To date, however, the contribution of class waivers to the NMR to small
businesses’ success in winning contracts is unknown. The purpose of this research,
therefore, is to explore whether industry characteristics influence the effectiveness of
class NMR waivers with regard to achieving their intended goal of improving small
business utilization on federal purchases, and if so, to what degree. This research is
important due to its implications not only for socio-economic program design but also for
effective and efficient channel design. Allowing small businesses to compete as
intermediaries broadens the competitive base of federal buying agencies; thus,
economic efficiencies are also at stake.
Generally, research has ignored key micro-level factors, especially in the context
of small businesses. There are roughly 28 million small businesses in the United States,
yet they are often ignored, despite the fact that ignoring SMEs in research is “in fact
totally inappropriate” (Spence & Lozano, 2000, p. 43). Our scan of the last 10 years of
the Journal of Small Business Management, Journal of Small Business Strategy, and
Journal of Small Business and Entrepreneurship revealed only 48 B2B articles

1

See, for instance, the requirements contained within Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR) 52.219-1, Small Business Program Representations, which state that a firm representing
itself as a small business concern must satisfy the criteria in 13 C.F.R. § 121.406.
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representing 8% of all contributions. Most of these articles address various aspects of
franchising. Furthermore, research in a business-to-government context is almost nonexistent. Only one article (Albano et al., 2015) addressed any aspect of small
businesses in the public sector.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Underlying theory relevant to
waivers to the NMR is synopsized. Next, the study presents the research design and
methodology, and then the study provides an analysis of the proposed model and
reports the findings. Lastly, the study offers a summary discussion, including conclusions
and implications.

Literature Review
Of all of the elements of a value chain, the marketing channel ranks highly in
importance (Krafft, Goetz, Mantrala, Sotgiu, & Tillmanns, 2015), with wholesale
distribution comprising revenues of $5.2 trillion in 2017. Nevertheless, they are not fully
understood. Scholars have called for a more unifying theory of distribution channels
(Ingene & Parry, 1995). Similarly, omni-channel research is largely void of theoretical
grounding (Erdem, Kotzab, Teller, Yumurtaci Hüseyinoglu Isik, & Pöppelbuß, 2018). The
interface between industry and government has also been identified as a promising
research avenue (Krafft et al., 2015).
Socio-economic programs have been used by both government and private
sectors to develop local economies, develop labor capabilities, and expand their
customer base. This macro strategy is well founded as “states with higher proportions of
very small business employment do indeed experience higher levels of productivity
growth, and Gross State Product growth, while having less wage inflation and lower
unemployment rates” (Robbins et al., 2000, p. 293). Sourcing from small, minorityowned enterprises can increase job creation and economic development in distressed
regions (Carter et al., 1999; Walker & Preuss, 2008). In turn, the income from these
businesses and employees thereof expand the firm’s customer base (Ram & Smallbone,
2003).
NMR waivers are one tool that allows government to fence off large business
manufacturers and distributors from competing against small business distributors for
contracts from the federal government segment. The lack of research into the
contribution of class NMR waivers or the circumstances conducive to their effectiveness
creates a sub-optimal situation where NMR waiver success—and the factors influencing
or impeding success—are not well understood. Evidence suggests that industry
characteristics significantly determine the success or failure of selected channels. NMR
waivers provide remedy for small businesses who must deal with power and conflict
against large businesses.
Research on channel power and conflict emerged as a distinct research group in
the 1990s by a study of the intellectual structure of retailing research (Chabowski, Hult,
& Mena, 2011). At this time, channel competition was also identified as a distinct group
of research. Matters of channel design continue to intrigue marketing scholars. Relevant
to NMR waivers, a content analysis of recent channels research (2010–2012) identified
vertical competition among seven key categories (Young & Merritt, 2013). Improving
channel performance and coordination as well as lessening channel conflict and power
were found to be prominent research themes, although with regard to small businesses,
research has a strong franchise focus. The focus on the tension between small
franchisees and large franchisors suggests that opportunistic use of power by larger
channel members can have long-lasting effects on trust and performance (Winsor et al.,
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2012). This calls into question the efficacy of NMR waivers to reassure or encourage
small businesses to engage in industries characterized by many large companies.
Another stream of research surrounding omni-channel retailing identified three
areas: channel demand side, channel supply side, and channel management and
strategy (Erdem et al., 2018). The channel supply side area focuses on supply chain
processes, with one group of papers addressing multi-channel fulfillment strategies. This
particular stream of research is underserved while considered a promising frontier of
inquiry (Erdem et al., 2018). In general, it appears that direct channels can be profitable
when channel members (manufacturers and retailers) share profits. This suggests that in
an environment with high price pressures (highly inflationary), small businesses will be at
a disadvantage with regard to negotiating profit sharing with large manufacturers.
From a supply management perspective (i.e., a buyer’s), channel design
presents a special case of strategy. With increased outsourcing, supply managers often
play the role of integrator, stitching together capabilities of suppliers into seamless
processes ranging from product development to delivery (Parker & Anderson, 2002).
Research suggests that the integration of product development, manufacturing process
design, and supply chain design can contribute to a competitive advantage (Ellram,
Tate, & Carter, 2007). The competitive advantage results from parallel cross-functional
coordination and strong supplier involvement, which suggests that industries
characterized by many small businesses may achieve more success and benefit more
from NMR waivers.
Firms concerned about corporate social responsibility often look to promote
socio-economic goals. In this case, channels can be customized to the value offering as
buyers seek qualified small business suppliers. Notwithstanding, best practices in supply
management suggest that, in some circumstances, buyers should develop capabilities in
strategic suppliers—termed supplier development in the literature (Krause, 1997). This,
of course, alters the supply chain for certain material and component inputs.
A key question in marketing channels is, Under what circumstances is a certain
channel structure appropriate? Class waivers to the non-manufacturer rule provide an
interesting test-bed to examine not only the effectiveness of a federal policy, but also the
conditions under which a direct channel will prevail over an indirect channel.
H1: There will be a negative, two-way interaction between industry-level
price inflation and issuance of class waivers to the non-manufacturer rule, such
that a waiver’s positive effect on small business utilization is attenuated when
industry-level prices are highly inflationary.
H2: There will be a negative, two-way interaction between industry
concentration and issuance of class waivers to the non-manufacturer rule, such
that a waiver’s positive effect on small business utilization is attenuated when
industries are highly concentrated.
H3: There will be a positive, two-way interaction between the proportion
of small firms in an industry and issuance of class waivers to the nonmanufacturer rule, such that a waiver’s positive effect on small business
utilization is amplified when there is a high proportion of small firms in an
industry.
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Data and Measures
The SBA’s class waiver list as of January 1, 2015, includes 139 waivers covering
72 NAICS categories (SBA, 2018), a majority of which cover chemicals, adhesives,
metals, carpet, storage tanks, construction equipment, turbines, ammunition, office
copiers, automobiles, computer equipment, televisions, medical equipment, aircraft, and
furniture.
To test the research hypotheses, a time-series panel was constructed using
multiple sources of archival data. Data on the issuance of class wavers to the nonmanufacturing rule by the SBA were collected from the administration’s current class
waiver list (SBA, 2018). This list contains information for each class waiver, including the
applicable industry as identified the by North American Industry Classification System
(NAICS) code, the type of product and an effective date for the waiver (the date the
class waiver was posted in the Federal Register). A total of 148 class waivers are on the
list, with waivers issued for products manufactured across 77 industries. Example class
waivers include ice-making machinery, turbines, hospital furniture, ammunition, and
turboprop aircraft.
Data on the government’s utilization of small suppliers were collected from the
Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG), which catalogs
unclassified transactions between federal agencies and firms for the purchase of goods
and services (Eckerd & Girth, 2017). In the context of government purchasing, a “small”
firm is formally defined for each industry by the SBA. Criteria for determining firm size
include the number of employees and/or average annual revenues. In FPDS-NG,
government buyers report for each purchase whether the purchase was made to a small
firm, based on representations made by the firm at the time of the purchase. We collect
FPDS data on contracts across the U.S. government. Our period of analysis begins with
Fiscal Year 2007, as significant improvements to FPDS data quality followed the
passage of the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 (Lewis,
2017). We do not collect FPDS data for transactions after 2015, as certain industry
establishment data (described below) are not available beyond 2015.
Lastly, to obtain information on industry characteristics, we obtain time-series
observations on industries from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the U.S. Census
Bureau. These data are detailed in the following sections. All economic data were
collected in their unseasonal form.
Dependent Variable
We measure federal performance on the utilization of small businesses concerns
as the proportion of awards to small businesses within a given NAICS code, on a given
annual measurement occasion, as reported in FPDS-NG. We refer to this variable as
UTILIZATION. The federal government similarly uses proportions to measure small
business utilization, as has prior research into the determinants of performance of small
business contracting programs (Smith & Fernandez, 2010).
Treatments
Our primary explanatory variable, TREATMENT, reflects waiver issuance and is
identified by an occurrence of one or more non-manufacturer waivers issued to an
industry in succession (i.e., within a six-month period), between the years 2007 and
2015. For instance, three class waivers were issued in August 2010 to the computer
storage device manufacturing industry (NAICS 334112) for automated data processing
input/output and storage devices, support equipment and supplies, reflecting a

Acquisition Research Program:
Creating Synergy for Informed Change
NAVAL Postgraduate School

- 310 -

treatment. A total of 20 treatments occurred during the period of analysis, to a total of 20
industries.
Moderators
Within H1, H2, and H3, we hypothesized that three industry-level moderators
would moderate (amplify or attenuate) the effects of non-manufacturer rule waivers on
small business utilization. The first moderator, CONCENTRATION, reflects the degree to
which market share is concentrated within firms in an industry. Industry concentration
data was obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau,2 of which the most recent data
available is from the 2012 economic census. CONCENTRATION is measured using the
50-firm Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), a summation of squared market shares.
Higher HHI values reflect greater concentration and may range to a maximum value of
10,000. We utilize 2012 HHI observations as our CONCENTRATION measure, and logtransformed the values to account for skew. As the economic census is performed every
five years, the only other possible index is from 2007, at the start of our analysis. 3 As we
later explain, we reserve the 2007 index instead for propensity score matching of treated
industries (those receiving waivers) with untreated industries. Thus, our measure of
CONCENTRATION remains time-invariant over the period of analysis.
The second moderator, SMALLPROP, reflects the proportion of small firms in
each industry, at each annual measurement occasion, operationalized as the proportion
of firms in an industry having less than 500 employees.4 Data on the distribution of firms
within industries by firm size were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Statistics of
U.S. Businesses (SUSB),5 which provides distributional data on enterprises in the U.S.
economy by size and industry. SUSB provides data on both firms and establishments,
where establishments are locations where work is performed (e.g., business locations)
and where one or more establishment may be nested within a firm (Headd & Kirchhoff,
2009). We exclusively utilize firm data when calculating SMALLPROP.
The third moderator, PRICEINDEX, is an annual, aggregate measure of the
prices received by domestic producers within an industry for their output. We obtain
industry-level price information from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), using the
producer price indices (PPIs) that they develop on each industry through a process of
systematic sampling within industries (BLS, 2016). We obtain PPIs in their nominal form
and apply a natural log transformation, following Pelztman (2000).

2

https://www.census.gov/econ/concentration.html
An alternative source, Compustat data is a common alternative to U.S. Census
Bureau’s concentration measure. However, it only accounts for public firms and correlates at a
mere 13% with the Census Bureau’s data, which is considered highly reliable (Ali et al., 2009).
4
This follows how industry-level data on firm size is reported by the U.S. Census Bureau.
The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) assigns various size standards to industries to
classify businesses as “small” under its programs, and SBA standards may be based on
revenues or number of employees, the latter of which may differ from 500 (although a threshold
of 500 employees is common).
5
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/susb.html
3
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Controls
We include three controls to account for potentially confounding effects from
other variables. First, we control for market competitiveness, as the average number of
offers received by federal purchasers in response to solicitations within an industry, and
at a given measurement occasion. Data on the number of offers received was collected
from FPDS-NG. Specifically, the COMPETITIVENESS measure reflects the average
number of offers received on RFPs that resulted in purchases. If no offers were received
and thus no purchase was made, then the data would not be included within the dataset.
However, if an RFP was later re-issued (which would typically be the case, possibly in
some modified form) and resulted in a purchase, then the data would be included within
the dataset. We control for competitiveness because it may be related to contract price
and several of our explanatory variables, including industry concentration, thus posing a
potential confound. Second, we account for growth in federal participation in markets for
goods manufactured by an industry by including a control for the number of new contract
awards within an industry, and at a given measurement occasion. Data on
PARTICIPATION was also collected from FPDS-NG and is measured as the count of
new contracts awarded by the federal government for goods manufactured by an
industry. However, as this count of awards alone may not fully account for the nature of
federal participation in markets, we include an additional control variable,
OBLIGATIONS, which measures the total contractual obligations by the federal
government on new contracts awarded by the federal government for goods
manufactured by an industry. All three variables were log-transformed to reduce the
effects of extreme values (positive skew) and to improve interpretability of regression
coefficients.
Matching by Propensity Score
To further guard against potential confounds, we use propensity score matching
to pair the 20 industries receiving a non-manufacturer rule waiver (“treatment”) during
the nine-year period with a similar set of industries who did not, thus creating an artificial
control group. Propensity score matching is a technique commonly used to reduce
exposure to potential confounds in settings characterized by non-randomized
assignment or self-selection on one or more treatment conditions (Rosenbaum & Rubin,
1983). Wangenheim and Bayón (2007) provide a detailed description of the propensity
score matching process. A logistic regression of TREATMENT on a series of covariates
including a count of pre-existing non-manufacturer rule waivers, small business
obligations, and initial level of industry concentration was estimated using data from the
year 2007. As 2007 is the first year in our sample, it reflects the initial conditions for the
industries at the start of our analysis. The logit model fit significantly better to the data
than did its null alternative (𝛸 4
20.11, 𝑝
.01). To identify matches, we utilize
caliper matching (Althauser & Rubin, 1970) with a tolerance of .20 of the standard
deviation of the propensity score, following the recommendations of Austin (2011). We
match industries without replacement with the objective of improving the precision of
modeling results (Dehejia & Wahba, 2002). Each of the 20 industries receiving treatment
in our dataset successfully matched to a similar, non-treated industry, thus resulting in a
balanced sample of 40 industries. As we have nine annual observations on each
industry, out total sample size is 360. Descriptive statistics and correlations for the
resulting dataset are listed within Table 1.
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Table 1. Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics

1. UTILIZATION
2. TREATMENT
3.
CONCENTRATION
4. SMALLPROP
5. PRICEINDEX
6.
COMPETITIVENESS
7. PARTICIPATION
8. OBLIGATIONS
Mean
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum

1
1.000
-0.191

2

3

4

5

1.000

0.145
-0.112
0.146

0.034
0.147
-0.050

1.000
0.235
0.094

1.000
-0.167

1.000

0.030
-0.433
-0.740
0.446
0.242
0.022
0.998

0.011
0.165
0.204
0.317
0.466
0.000
1.000

0.100
0.102
-0.001
5.149
1.176
0.693
6.172

0.161
0.169
0.300
0.776
0.166
0.163
0.991

0.112
0.012
-0.105
5.014
0.413
3.619
5.779

6

7

8

1.000
-0.024
-0.074
1.668
1.216
-1.611
6.458

1.000
0.641
7.635
1.448
3.497
11.265

1.000
18.840
1.861
13.314
23.021

Model and Methodology
A model of federal utilization of small businesses concerns as a function of class
non-manufacturer rule waiver treatments is given in Equation 1.

(1)
Given that the dependent variable is a proportion (a fraction) and is bounded
between values of zero and one, estimation of the model using ordinary least squares
can result in the prediction of values outside of the (0,1) interval (Papke & Wooldridge,
1996). Further, residuals produced from an ordinary least squares regression are
unlikely to meet the assumptions of homogeneity and, thus, bias is likely in standard
errors under the ordinary least squares estimator (Cohen et al., 2003, p. 240). Smith and
Fernandez (2010) provide a discussion of this issue in the context of modeling small
business utilization proportions, and identify several potential solutions, including the use
of a quasi-maximum likelihood estimation technique developed by Papke and
Wooldridge (1996). We also adopt this approach, but utilize the extension of the
technique proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (2008) for estimating fractional response
models with panel data, a Bernoulli quasi-MLE (QMLE) estimator (Papke & Wooldridge,
2008). Explanatory variables in QLME are specified as (1, 𝐗 𝒊𝒕 , 𝐗 𝒊 ) (Papke & Wooldridge,
2008, p. 124). As our interest is in change over time in the fractional response (i.e., the
within-variance component), we limit our presentation of QLME results to those given by
𝐗 𝒊𝒕 .
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Results
Model estimation was performed in R (R Core Team, 2018). Estimates are
presented in Table 2 and have been rescaled following the procedure given by Papke
and Wooldridge (2008, Equation 3.11). As previously discussed, all three moderator
variables (CONCENTRATION, SMALLPROP, PRICEINDEX) were centered about their
grand means prior to entry into the regression equation. Thus, the coefficient for the nonmanufacturer rule waiver treatment, TREATMENT, reflects the model-estimated effect of
a waiver issuance at average levels of industry concentration, when the proportion of
small firms in this industry is average, and at average prices. At this point, the simple
effect (simple slope) of the waiver treatment is not decidedly non-zero (β* = .036, t =
1.704, p = .088).
Table 2. Regression Results

Explanatory Variable

Estimate

Unscaled

Std. Error

t-value

Pr(>|t|)

0.036

0.098

0.058

1.704

0.088 *

-0.040

-0.123

0.047

-2.684

0.007 **

0.305

0.875

1.458

0.600

0.549

0.046

0.231

0.268

0.860

0.390

0.050

0.130

0.289

0.449

0.653

TREATMENT

-0.106

-0.320

0.153

-2.095

0.036 **

COMPETITIVENESS (control)

-0.023

-0.066

0.033

-2.017

0.044 **

PARTICIPATION (control)

0.036

0.092

0.045

2.057

0.040 **

OBLIGATIONS (control)

-0.056

-0.153

0.083

-1.844

0.065 *

TREATMENT
CONCENTRATION

TREATMENT

SMALLPROP
SMALLPROP

TREATMENT

PRICEINDEX
PRICEINDEX

Notes. *p<.10, **p<.05. CONCENTRATION, SMALLPROP, AND PRICEINDEX are grand-mean centered.

Consistent with the expectations of Hypothesis 1, industry concentration
(CONCENTRATION) has a statistically significant and negative moderating effect on the
waiver treatment (t = -2.684, p < .01). Figure 1 depicts this interaction, providing simple
slopes for the effect of the waiver treatment on small business utilization at high and low
values of industry concentrations (± one standard deviation from the mean). Estimates
and standard errors for the simple slopes were calculated using the mean vector and
variance-covariance matrix for the model-implied coefficients (Spiller et al., 2013). When
industry concentration is low, the waiver treatment has a positive and statistically
significant effect on small business utilization (β* = .085, t = 2.876, p = .004). However,
when industry concentration is high, the waiver has no discernable impact on small
business utilization (β* = -.017, t = -.675, p = .500).
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Figure 1.

. Interaction Plot of CONCENTRATION and Non-Manufacturer Rule
Waiver Treatment

The statistical model offered no support for Hypotheses 2, which suggested that
the proportion of small firms in the industry (SMALLPROP) would amplify the effect of
the waiver treatment. While the coefficient estimate for the interaction term was indeed
positive, there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the effect exists (i.e., differs
from a value of zero) in the population (β* = .046, t = .860, p = .390).
Hypothesis 3 was supported by the model. This hypothesis suggested that a
waiver treatment would be less effective for industries experiencing high levels of price
growth (PRICEINDEX). This implies a negative coefficient for the interaction term, as
was estimated by the model (β* = -.106, t = -2.095, p = .036). The resulting interaction is
depicted within Figure 2. When the industry price index (PPI) is low, the waiver treatment
has a significant and positive effect on small business utilization (β* = .079, t = 2.657, p
= .008). However, when the industry price index (PPI) is high, the effectiveness of the
waiver treatment is attenuated, and does not appear to differ from a value of zero in the
population (β* = -.012, t = -.406, p = .685).
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Figure 2.

Interaction Plot of PRICEINDEX (PPI) and Non-Manufacturer Rule
Waiver Treatment

Discussion
This is the first study that we are aware of to examine, using empirical data,
industry-level conditions that amplify or attenuate the effectiveness of non-mandatory
small business programs, such as class waiver program for the non-manufacturer rule.
The study also provides a unique context to study the efficacy of marketing channel
designs under differing industry conditions.
Our analysis demonstrates that industry-level factors strongly condition the
effectiveness of class waivers to the non-manufacturing rule. For the “average” industry
(e.g., as a measured by concentration, price levels, and the proportion of small firms in
the industry), a class waiver may have little influence alone on small business utilization.
This finding is not entirely surprising, given that the waivers are meant to be exceptions,
and thus should not be expected to perform well in a general case (i.e., under general
industry conditions). Yet, under the correct industry conditions, the waivers appear to
have a robust, positive impact on small business outcomes. These conditions are
discussed next.
The statistical results for our first hypothesis point to the criticality of industry
composition to the efficacy of class waivers and, more broadly, to the success of
targeted small business policies and programs. We found that, when industry
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concentration was high, issuance of a class waiver had no impact on the utilization of
small businesses. Yet, when industry concentration is low, a waiver can produce a
marked increase in small business utilization. Clearly, this result does not imply that the
U.S. Small Business Administration should adopt a practice of broadly issuing class
waivers within low-concentration industries. It does imply, however, that regulators and
policy makers should consider the conditions present in the industry within the review
and decision-making process for waiver issue: Low concentration can catalyze the
waivers’ effects. If concentration in an industry is high, then regulators might instead
seek alternative mechanisms to spur small business growth and development, such as
through bonding and funding programs.
Similarly, our results suggest that price stability—and the avoidance of high
levels of industry price inflation—is critical to the success of the class waiver program.
High industry-level prices nullified the positive effect that a class waiver to the nonmanufacturer rule might otherwise have on small business utilization. There are two
potential explanations for this. First, transaction costs between channel partners tend to
rise as instability and uncertainty increases. Not only might quantities of final demand be
more uncertain, but channel members may be incentivized to alter ordering and
inventory behavior, reducing the potential for up-stream channel members to capitalize
on potential economies in production and logistics. If additional transaction costs accrue
between manufacturers and resellers (e.g., wholesalers, retailers), then pricing through
indirect channels may become less competitive. Further, when prices are on the rise,
buyers looking to enter into medium or long-term relationships for a class of products
may be less willing to pay for value-added services provided by channel partners (e.g.,
local post-sales support), given the risk of future price increases.
Lastly, counter to our expectations, the data did not offer support for an
amplification of the class waiver’s effect when industries were comprised of a high
proportion of small firms. However, this absence of an effect may not be entirely
surprising. On one extreme, a waiver could not be expected to fare well at increasing
small business utilization in an industry devoid of small businesses. On the other
extreme, an industry that is already highly saturated with small business may already
experience high levels of utilization, and thus the marginal benefit of a waiver may be
minimal. For this reason, the relationship may truly be a polynomial (e.g., a quadratic
and inverted-U), such that the waivers effects are greatest when there is only a
moderate proportion of small businesses operating within the industry. While we were
unable to test this proposition with our data, we discuss it as an area for future research.
Implications for Practice
Government procurement leaders who seek to maximize all tools at their
disposal in order to comply by laws that facilitate small business participation may be
disappointed to discover that factors beyond their control may render waivers an
impotent tool. This suggests that procurement leaders should first conduct market
analysis of industry factors; a basic understanding of the economic and environmental
conditions can augment the effectiveness of waivers, where they are effective.
Waivers are least effective in industries characterized by high concentration and
high price inflation, conditions that pose other procurement challenges. Knowing this,
procurement managers who are forewarned of industry conditions can develop
strategies appropriate to the industry and purchase circumstances. One could cite the
success of specific examples of federal procurement initiatives that exhibit this
approach, such as DIUx. DIUx caters to specific product-market-industry

Acquisition Research Program:
Creating Synergy for Informed Change
NAVAL Postgraduate School

- 317 -

characteristics—perhaps offices specialized by purchasing circumstances would be
appropriate for certain other industries.
Procurement managers might also consider the broader competitive and
innovative benefits of providing certain resources to small businesses. Small businesses
may suffer due to higher transaction costs relative to large businesses. At the individual
business level, transaction costs for small businesses are usually lower (c.f.,
Paparoidamis et al., forthcoming), although purchase volume often would drive the use
of many small businesses, for a greater sum of transaction costs than results from open
market purchases from another large business. Facilitating inter-company information
flows may be a strategy that re-empowers the NMR waiver so that it improves small
business engagement.
Implications for Theory
Transaction costs enjoy an ample and well-established body of research with
regard to government policies, yet relatively few studies connect transaction costs with
channel design considerations in the context of government procurement. Environmental
factors such as industry concentration and inflationary conditions may comprise the
single most important consideration for the success of government initiatives to support
small businesses, and these findings suggest that research should consider further
moderator effects of environmental factors on government procurement policies. High
industry concentration seemed to diminish the positive effects of waivers on small
business, which may result from the relatively low transaction costs for large
transactions among few large enterprises in highly concentrated industries, suggesting a
primary role for transaction costs as an explanatory theory, at least for endogenous
variables.
On the other hand, Coase (1937) originally proposed that the limit of the firm will
occur where marginal transaction (“buy”) costs will just balance marginal production
(“make”) costs, so it may be that exogenous variables related to industry structural
factors ultimately determine production and transaction costs. For example,
technological and product life-cycle maturity may determine the degree of industry
concentration and its subsequent effects on small business participation. Our results
provide evidence for the importance of structural factors. To address this structural
difference between industries with regard to the effectiveness of waivers, transaction
cost theory suggests that publicly funded information exchange networks may reduce
transaction costs for small businesses in order generate the same waiver benefits for
high concentration industries as for low. Institutional theory may offer an alternative both
as an explanation and a remedy, suggesting that the social and regulatory environment
surrounding highly concentrated industries may explain the difference in waiver
outcomes, while simultaneously providing an example to emulate. Specifically, one-sizefits-all approaches to encourage small business participation may be infeasible, and
tailoring of institutions may yield greater returns (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013).
Considering that traditional approaches have failed to resolve entirely the issue
of sufficient federal procurement engagement with small business, new theory should be
considered. Since small business policy is based in part upon creating healthier, more
resilient, and more innovative economies, endogenous growth theory and the knowledge
spillover theory of entrepreneurship may offer perspectives to study small business
waivers that could explain our findings while providing guidance to public policy (c.f.,
Huggins & Thompson, 2015).
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Study Limitations
This study has several limitations that should be kept in mind. A primary
limitation, and one that we share with other research utilizing archival data, is that we are
unable to directly observe or measure mechanisms that we theorize to underlie effects.
Indeed, while we believe the theory and mechanisms that we rely on to be plausible, we
are unable to conclude through our data or statistical analysis that these are truly the
mechanisms that are at work and that our specification is indeed “correct” (Cudeck &
Henly, 1991). Second, as data is not available on the issuance of individual (vs. class)
waivers to the non-manufacturing rule, we are unable to control for the role that these
waivers might have on promoting small business utilization. It seems likely, for instance,
that industries most conducive to requests and approvals of individual waivers would
also be most conducive to requests for class waivers.
Future Research Directions
Class NMR waivers usually originate from small business intermediaries who
want to be eligible for somewhat restricted markets (small businesses only via setasides). Future research could explore instances in which the buying agency originates
the NMR waiver (i.e., an “individual” waiver) with the goals to understand (1) the
circumstances in which this occurs, and (2) why it does not occur more often.
Government buyers often do not conduct effective market research (Pang, 2018) and
demonstrate a lack of commitment to small business goals (Hawkins, Gravier, &
Randall, 2018).
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